



This is the fourth annual report by the European
Economic Advisory Group (EEAG) at CESifo. It
contains four chapters addressing different topics of
policy concern for the European Union and the euro
area and also a macroeconomic outlook for the
European economy. This executive summary provides
a synopsis of the analysis and policy proposals of the
report.
Chapter 1 discusses the current situation and eco-
nomic outlook for 2005 for the European economy.
As a main scenario, it is forecasted that GDP in the
euro area will grow at about the same rate as in 2004,
that is around 13/4 percent on average. The recovery
remains fragile and depends on continued growth in
the world economy. The recent rise of the euro against
the dollar and any additional oil price hikes represent
significant downside risks to the basic scenario. For
economic policy the basic scenario is that interest
rates remain at current levels and that the stance of
fiscal policy is similar to 2004. An appendix to the
chapter reviews the current problems with the
Stability and Growth Pact of the EU. 
Chapter 2 is devoted to the widely debated topic of
outsourcing of production and jobs from the Western
EU member countries to the new member countries
and also to the rest of the world. This trend is clearly
visible in the manufacturing sector in the European
Union. Outsourcing is mainly a consequence of the
trade integration of ex-communist countries as well as
other producers that offer their labour at low cost.
While outsourcing can bring benefits from increased
international trade and division of labour, these ben-
efits may not materialise fully given the labour market
rigidities in many Western EU countries. These rigidi-
ties may induce outsourcing to overshoot its optimal
level and destroy more jobs than can be created in
other parts of the economy. 
Chapter 3 reviews working time developments in
Western Europe. The main issue is whether recent
agreements on longer working time (at unchanged
pay) in Germany represent a reversal of the earlier
trend towards shorter working time that could also
spread to other Western European countries with low
working hours, such as Belgium, France and the
Netherlands. The chapter views the agreements on
longer working hours in Germany as a response to
credible employer threats of outsourcing jobs.
Increases in working time will certainly raise output,
but they are also likely to increase the number of jobs,
especially in the long run. 
Chapter 4 is a primer of key economic issues in the
reform of pension systems in the EU. The chapter
begins with an overview on the strains on European
pension systems that loom ahead as a result of the
ageing populations in the EU countries. The old-age
dependency ratios are forecasted to grow to very high
levels, which has major fiscal implications, as the pen-
sion system is, to a large extent, a part of the public
sector. The chapter discusses principles for reforms of
the pension systems that are needed to fix the emerg-
ing budget problems and to improve efficiency. The
strain can be relieved to some extent by increasing the
retirement age and lowering pension benefits, as well
as by adopting more general structural policies that
enhance economic growth. Our key recommendation
is to add a funded pillar to the existing pay-as-you-go
systems, to mitigate the missing human capital (due to
ageing) by adding incentives for real capital forma-
tion. Moreover, the pay-as-you-go pension could be
differentiated according to the number of children,
provided individually tailored savings plans for the
funded pillar are designed to ensure a sufficient level
of overall pensions for the childless. 
Chapter 5 considers recent developments of house
prices in different European countries. There has been
widespread worry that house prices might collapse as
happened in Japan, the United Kingdom and the
Nordic countries in the early 1990s. The country expe-
riences in the last ten years are far from uniform, with
rapid price rises in some countries (for example,
Ireland, Spain, the Netherlands and the UK) and only
small price increases in other countries (for example,
France and Germany). A variety of different econom-
ic determinants influence the level of house prices.Houses provide accommodation services, and, being
durable assets, investment motives also affect house
prices. Analysis of these economic factors suggests
that, while current house prices may be overvalued to
some extent in some EU countries, there is little evi-
dence of major speculative bubbles in house prices in
these countries. In our view, there is no scientific basis
for claims that house prices are about to collapse due
to a bursting bubble. 
The European economy: current situation and 
economic outlook for 2005 (Chapter 1) 
In 2004 the European economy strengthened and out-
put growth was close to its trend, although the output
gap remained large and unemployment increased fur-
ther. The recovery was export-led with spending shift-
ing only gradually to domestic demand. In the first
half of 2004, growth was stronger than expected, but
the expansion lost momentum in the second half as
oil prices increased and the world economy slowed.
Boosted by stronger export growth, investment start-
ed to increase in the euro area after a decline in the
two preceding years, although its pace of recovery
remained moderate. Private consumption remained
subdued reflecting low real income growth, which was
depressed by higher energy prices and poor labour
market conditions. Consumer spending developments
were, however, not uniform. In a few countries, such
as France, Spain and Portugal, consumer spending
recovered – partly reflecting a decline in household
savings – while in others, in particular Germany, it
remained weak.
Economic growth was again higher in the United
Kingdom than in the three big euro countries France,
Italy and Germany and was also above average in all
Nordic countries and in Ireland as well as in Spain.
Central and Eastern European economies also
achieved higher growth than the EU average – reflect-
ing their catching-up from low income levels – with
the highest growth being recorded in the Baltic states,
Poland and Slovakia. 
During the course of 2005, the ongoing expansion of
the world economy should continue to support
export growth in Europe, although on average euro
area exports are expected to increase somewhat less
than in 2004. Private consumption is expected to
increase moderately, supported by – after the oil
price effect has subsided – a decline in consumer
price inflation and also in some countries by addi-
tional tax reductions.
With the continued strength in exports, further
improving profit margins and favourable financing
conditions, the recovery in investment that began in
2004 is expected to strengthen in 2005. Capacity utili-
sation in the export sector has increased, and in
domestically oriented sectors, where capacity utilisa-
tion is still low, there is mounting pressure to mod-
ernise the capital stock.
On average, output in the euro area is expected to
grow at about the same rate as in 2004, namely 13/4 per
cent. The output gap will continue to remain relative-
ly large and improvements in labour markets will be
modest as unemployment is forecasted to fall only a
little. The growth gap between Europe and the United
States will narrow somewhat but only because growth
in the United States is forecasted to decelerate more
than in Europe.
The recovery in Europe remains fragile and depends
on the global upturn remaining intact without any
additional oil price hike and on the assumption that
the appreciation of the euro will be contained. The
forecast also assumes that the European Central Bank
will leave interest rates unchanged during 2005 and
that the structural fiscal deficit will decline somewhat.
With less favourable assumptions about the world
economy, oil prices, exchange rates and monetary
policies, growth of the European economy would be
even weaker. 
As to the Stability and Growth Pact, the development
is very worrisome. We seem to be witnessing a gradual
dismantling of fiscal discipline within the EU through
contagion effects, where high deficits in one country
are seen as an excuse for high deficits also in others.
The on-going discussions on the reform of the pact
are likely to result in a further loosening of the rules.
The main problem with most reform proposals is that
they do not address the key issue of ex post enforce-
ment. Credible enforcement would require either that
the decision-making in the excessive deficit procedure
is moved to the judicial system, that is to the
European Court of Justice, or that sanctions are low-
ered and made more gradual such that politicians
dare use them. 
Since a political agreement on credible enforcement of
the stability pact is improbable, one had probably bet-




discipline through the EU have largely failed. The les-
son is then that the foundations for sound fiscal poli-
cy must be built through better institutions at the
national level. Such reforms should learn from mone-
tary policy and imply more transparent policy frame-
works, including reliance on independent national fis-
cal policy committees that could either be given a con-
sultative role or be entrusted with some decision-mak-
ing powers, as suggested in earlier EEAG reports. 
Outsourcing (Chapter 2)
Since the fall of the Iron Curtain and the integration
of China into the world trading system, international
trade in goods and services has increased significant-
ly. This is a consequence of the large differences in
factor endowments and hence in relative prices
between the earlier OECD countries and the countries
that have been opened up to international trade.
Trade in intermediary products has developed partic-
ularly rapidly due to outsourcing activities of firms
that have tried to make use of the huge wage differ-
ences between the formerly separated parts of the
world. Major improvements in information and com-
munication technologies in the 1990s are a second rea-
son for the increases in outsourcing. The new interna-
tional production patterns have caused the domestic
value added per unit of output, the so-called produc-
tion depth, to decline in many sectors. 
This trend towards a reduction in domestic produc-
tion depth has been particularly strong in the manu-
facturing sector, the importance of which has declined
significantly in recent years in most western European
countries where it now usually accounts for about one
quarter of total production and one fifth of aggregate
employment. Furthermore, the share of manufactur-
ing value added in GDP has been declining in recent
years. A closer look at the input-output tables shows
that this trend of deindustrialisation is related to out-
sourcing activities of domestic firms. Parts of the pro-
duction process have been moved to low-wage coun-
tries. In particular, the new members of the European
Union in Eastern Europe are at the receiving end of
outsourcing done by Western European firms. 
Outsourcing is not limited only to manufacturing. In
Germany, for example, it has been shown that these
phenomena apply to the export sector as a whole.
From 1991 to 2002, an additional unit of real exports
induced, on average, a 55 percent increase in interme-
diate imports. Only 45 percent of the increase in
exports implied additional value added in Germany, a
phenomenon that has been caricatured as the “bazaar
effect”. Nevertheless, export-induced value added
grew relative to GDP, which is a natural implication
of increased specialisation. 
In principle, outsourcing activities can lead to gains
from trade for all countries involved. The low-wage
countries of Eastern Europe and Asia find new and
profitable employment activities for their large labour
forces and are able to increase their wages. And the
high-wage countries of the West are able to withdraw
part of their endowments of labour and capital from
labour-intensive sectors to use them more productive-
ly in the service and high-tech sectors where they may
have comparative advantages. 
Outsourcing is a special form of international trade
that can be expected to boost world GDP and world
welfare, because it allows countries to specialise on
the basis of their comparative advantages. However,
for the gains from trade to occur it is essential that the
domestic factor markets in the West are flexible
enough to allow for the necessary factor migration
between shrinking and expanding sectors. 
While capital markets in Europe do seem largely to
meet this requirement, labour markets are rather
rigid. For one thing, national job protection measures
prevent workers from moving easily between sectors.
For another, collective wage agreements and welfare-
state provisions that ensure high replacement pay-
ments for the non-employed prevent the necessary
wage flexibility. Gains from trade go hand in hand
with a tendency towards factor price equalisation. In
particular, the specialisation in more capital-intensive
production requires lower wages of the less-skilled
workers relative to wages of skilled workers in order
to prevent unemployment. If wages are rigid, this
process cannot take place. The sectors where the West
has a comparative disadvantage shrink too quickly,
setting more labour free than is useful, and the grow-
ing sectors where there is a comparative advantage do
not create enough additional jobs. A growing level of
unemployment results. 
In some European countries we see strong signs for
such a deficiency of the adjustment process. Thus, we
advocate policies to make the labour market more
flexible. The necessary measures are the ones we have
recommended in our earlier reports. The measures
range from more limited job protection policies via
opening clauses for collective wage agreementstowards policies of activating social aid that reduce
labour costs and give further incentives to work,
thereby changing the role of the welfare state from a
competitor to a partner of private enterprises.
Longer working hours – the beginning of a new
trend? (Chapter 3)
Both hours worked per capita and hours worked per
employee are low in several continental European
countries, such as Germany, France, Belgium and the
Netherlands, as compared to the United States. This
accounts for a large part of the income difference
between Western Europe and the United States. The
low working hours in Europe reflect to a large extent
low standard working hours for full-time employees. 
Recent company-level deals in Germany on longer
working time may represent a reversal of the earlier
trend towards shorter working time that could spread
also to other Western European countries with low
working hours. It seems that especially the French dis-
cussion has been much affected by working time
developments in Germany, but also employer
demands in Belgium and the Netherlands have been
influenced. The agreements in Germany have implied
longer working hours without pay compensation. The
deals can be seen as cost-cutting measures made nec-
essary by both increased international competition in
product markets and credible employer threats to out-
source jobs abroad associated with on-going globali-
sation in general and EU enlargement in particular, as
analysed in Chapter 2.
One way of thinking about the deals on longer
working time is as a convenient way of reducing
hourly wages without reducing the pay per employ-
ee. It is natural that such agreements take place at
the decentralised level of firms exposed to harsh
competitive pressures rather than at more cen-
tralised levels of bargaining. The deals on longer
working time can also be viewed as a labour supply
response in collective bargaining to a reduction in
the hourly wage that is required as a response to the
forces of globalisation. The desired working time
on the part of trade unions may respond different-
ly to a wage change than the desired working time
on the part of employees when acting on their own.
We argue that it is likely to be in the interest of
unions (workers acting collectively) to accept
increases in working time when real wages per unit
of time have to fall. 
When analysing the effects of longer working hours, it
is essential to distinguish between the short run and
the long run. In the short run, longer working hours
at unchanged pay, as in Germany, will by definition
prevent job losses in firms where there is an acute risk
of outsourcing production because costs are too high.
Also in firms where this is not the case, such agree-
ments will have positive employment effects, provided
that the longer working time of employees leads to a
large enough increase in the utilisation of capital,
because the capital stock can be operated for longer
hours. Indeed, such an increase in capital utilisation is
one of the major advantages of longer working hours.
The capital utilisation effect makes an immediate out-
put increase possible without the need to restructure
the production process. In other firms where the oper-
ating time of capital does not increase with working
time (for example, because shift work or overlapping
working times of employees have detached the oper-
ating time of capital from working time) or where it
takes time to restructure the production process, the
employment effects are likely to be negative in the
short run. Lower wages per hour will, however, make
it profitable even for these firms to expand output. 
In the long run, the hourly real wage level in an open
economy must be such that capital earns the same rate
of return as abroad. It follows that the long-run feasi-
ble hourly wage depends on the world market rate of
return to capital. A critical factor for the long-run
employment effects of an economy-wide lengthening
of working hours is therefore how wage-setting incen-
tives are affected. If longer working time creates
stronger incentives for wage moderation, lower unem-
ployment is needed in equilibrium to discourage
wages from rising above the feasible level. Although
neither theoretical nor empirical research gives unam-
biguous conclusions, there is a presumption that
longer working hours would contribute to wage mod-
eration. If so, one should expect positive employment
effects in the long run from longer working time. This
would then add to the positive long-run output effects
of an increase in working time that would arise
already at an unchanged employment level. 
Pensions and children (Chapter 4)
Public pension systems in most countries are currently
based on the pay-as-you-go principle, in which current
contributions are used to pay the pensions of people in
retirement. Under current conditions, most pay-as-




the old-age dependency ratios are forecasted to grow
from the current 0.2-0.3 range to as high as 0.4-0.68
pensioners per worker in 2050, which would eventual-
ly require a very large increase in tax rates, and/or a
reduction in pensions. Reform is required and it
should aim not only at fixing the budget problem but
also at designing a more efficient pension system.
A general slowdown in the growth of living standards
associated with ageing is inevitable. Pension reform
that entails a move to a partially funded system (in
which workers make savings in personal accounts
toward their future pensions) will not prevent the
slowdown and cannot benefit all generations.
However, such a move may help stimulate national
savings and smooth the pension burden across genera-
tions. The pension crisis results from a lack of human
capital. Partial funding means filling the human capi-
tal gap with real capital. It thus helps mitigate the pro-
vision crisis to be expected when the baby boomers
receive their pensions. Funded pension components
may also increase the scope for individual flexibility by
allowing people to choose their pension level and
retirement age at an actuarially fair rate, and thus alle-
viate political conflicts associated with ageing. 
One should ensure that private pension funds have an
appropriate risk structure. That includes limiting
exposure to stock market fluctuations and minimising
the correlation between the financial risk of pension
wealth and labour market risk. Thus portfolios of pen-
sion funds should be adequately diversified, with a
critical mass of risk-free assets and a very limited
exposure to assets in the firm and sector in which the
worker is employed. Simple legal rules should be
designed to supervise and regulate fund management
so as to minimise budget risks and social costs associ-
ated with financial instability and moral hazard in
financial markets. These rules should also provide
strong incentives to contain the managing costs of
pension funds. Especially in the initial phase of a
reform, these costs may levitate in a privatised system
because of aggressive advertising by an excessive num-
ber of providers. The introduction of an individually
based, privately managed, funded pillar of the pension
system would allow for a great deal of individual flex-
ibility, provided it satisfies these requirements. It
would be a good idea for those European countries
that have not already done so to complement the exist-
ing pay-as-you-go system with such a pillar.
A number of other margins of manoeuvre also exist
that would contribute to fixing the problem of sus-
tainability of the pension system. To the extent that
part of ageing is due to an increase in life expectancy
and that people are healthier, it is perfectly natural to
raise the retirement age, which has trended down-
wards for many years in most countries. Pre-retire-
ment schemes that are meant to artificially reduce reg-
istered unemployment, while increasing the burden on
pensions, should be avoided altogether. Structural
reform in the labour market, although desirable in its
own right, will also have a positive effect on pension
finance by increasing employment, thus increasing the
tax base for contributions.
The fiscal system could be amended so as to reduce its
distortionary impact on people’s decision to have chil-
dren. Specifically, when deciding on the number of
children, people may ignore the fiscal benefits
brought by children to society in the form of contri-
butions to pensions and may therefore have fewer chil-
dren than is socially desirable. One could envisage
reforms to address this issue. A partial indexation of
pay-as-you-go pension claims on the number of chil-
dren is one possibility. Additional self-financed
mandatory funded pensions for those who have no or
only few children could then supplement the pay-as-
you-go pension for those with no or only few children.
People who do not raise children have on average
more funds to save for their old-age pension. Also,
personal income taxation can be differentiated
according to the number of children and systems of
child allowance be used to provide stronger incentives
towards having children.
House prices in Europe (Chapter 5)
In the last ten years, home prices have risen in all EU
member states, and especially in Ireland, Spain, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. But the vari-
ety of experience demonstrates that Europe is still far
from a single housing market, and it raises particular
questions for the implementation of a common mon-
etary policy.
There has been growing concern that there is a house
price “bubble”. There is an important distinction
between a bubble – when prices are high because buy-
ers believe prices will rise further and in which prices
become entirely divorced from fundamental values –
and a period of rapid price increase, or even over-val-
uation. In this chapter, we look at the fundamental
determinants of house prices. We ask whether there is
evidence of a bubble in house prices: do present levelsand recent increases take them to levels, which cannot
be sustained by a reasonable view of these fundamen-
tal determinants?
The housing market is complex because housing is
both a consumption good and an asset. We employ
both perspectives, asking whether housing consump-
tion now represents an implausibly and unsustainably
high proportion of overall household expenditure,
and whether house prices are now valued on a basis
inconsistent with the valuation basis applied to other
assets. Our answer to both questions is negative – cur-
rent levels of house prices do not make housing unaf-
fordable for typical households, nor do houses seem
markedly expensive relative to other assets.
Commentators who emphasise the ratio of house
prices to incomes, which is historically high in many
countries, have not taken sufficient account of the
effect of falling real and nominal interest rates on
both the price of housing services and the valuation
of other assets. In this sense, current house prices are
not outside the range of reasonable estimates of fun-
damental value, and there is no house price bubble.
This does not mean that we believe that house prices
will continue to rise at the rate that has recently been
experienced. Many speculative asset prices, and the
housing market in particular, tend to follow a pattern
of positive serial correlation in the short run and neg-
ative serial correlation in the long run. This means
that a month in which house prices rise is more often
than not followed by another month in which house
prices rise, but a long period of above-average rises is
normally followed by a similarly long period of
below-average rises. Thus the longer the present rise
continues, the more certain it is that we will see some
years of relatively stable or even falling prices.
Moreover, future macroeconomic developments can
affect house prices. For example, high public deficits
in several countries may lead to higher real rates of
interest, which in turn can have a negative impact on
house prices. It is, however, notoriously difficult to
determine when the long run begins or to predict the
impact of uncertain macro developments. It is not
necessarily the case that houses in any or all EU states
are overvalued at current prices. 
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